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Rural Health Care and State
Antitrust Reform
by Michael S. Jacobs*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Now more than a hundred years old, the federal antitrust laws seek
generally to promote and preserve business competition. Over the past
twenty years, courts and regulatory agencies have applied this broad
goal in a narrow economic sense, defining "competition" not as rivalry,
for example, but as those forms of business activity most conducive to
"consumer welfare."' Consumer welfare, in this sense, is thought to be
maximized when markets produce the greatest output of goods or
services at the lowest prices with the widest range of consumer choice.2
For purposes of analysis, antitrust courts view all markets and market
participants through the same economic lens: services are not distinguished from goods nor are nonprofit firms given a dispensation
unavailable to the for-profit sector.3
During the same two decades, vigorous application of the antitrust
laws to the activities of organized health care providers has played a
critical role in moving health care markets in the direction of greater
competition. Starting with the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Goldfarb,4 which declared that professionals enjoy no special
exemption from the federal antitrust laws, a series of important opinions
identified and prohibited significant forms of anticompetitive conduct in
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. Dartmouth College (B.A., 1968);
Yale Law School (J.D., 1971); Johns Hopkins University (M.P.H., 1987).
1. For a discussion of this development, see Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the
Normative Foundationsof Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226-32 (1995).
2. Id. at 230. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-26 (1982).
3. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); United States v. Brown
Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
4. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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the health care field. At the same time, federal antitrust enforcement
facilitated the emergence of new, more efficient forms of health care
delivery by consistently examining the efforts of market incumbents to
prevent or impede new forms of competition. The Federal Trade
Commission, for example, successfully challenged the American Medical
Association's ("AMA") ethical proscriptions against competitive contracting and affiliation with Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs").'
Courts repeatedly struck down efforts by physicians and hospitals
designed to destroy competition from innovative financing arrangements' or from alternative care providers 7 and prohibited attempts by
physician and hospital groups to fix collectively the prices that their
members would charge consumers."
Many of these cases are well known to antitrust lawyers and scholars.
They have established what is now a widely accepted conceptual
framework for antitrust analysis; one that views health care professionals and institutions as profit-maximizing market participants, no less
inclined than other business entities to seek monopoly profits at the
expense of consumer well being and whose business activities are judged
by the same rules that govern the transactions of more "conventional"
corporations. 9 Using this framework, federal courts and agencies
continue to try and promote competition in health care markets,
primarily by proscribing arrangements that unfairly threaten to raise
prices and reduce output.1 0
I want to begin, however, not by rehearsing these famous cases, but
by describing a lesser known opinion rarely cited by antitrust scholars

5. American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), affd as modified, American Medical
Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
6. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Ball Memorial
Hosp.. Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Medical Serv. Corp., 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976) (prohibiting concerted action to
deny participation in Blue Cross plan to doctors employed by HMO); Wilk v. AMA, 895
F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990) (prohibiting efforts by society of
physicians to boycott chiropractors through the enactment of a so-called "ethical rule"
banning the former from associating in any way with "unscientific" practitioners).
8. United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986);
Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983).
9. Although the Supreme Court stated in footnote 17 of Goldfarb v. Virginia Bar Ass'n,
421 U.S. 773 (1975), that "it would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities" and suggested that the "public service
aspect, and other features of the professions" might justify the application to them of
different antitrust rules, the Court has never acted on this suggestion.
10. For a short, clear expression of the philosophy that underlies current federal
antitrust enforcement efforts in the health care field, see Hearing on HR. 2925 before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (February 27, 1996) (statement
of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the FTC).

1996]

STATE ANTITRUST REFORM

1047

and little mentioned in the current debate about the continued wisdom
of vigorous antitrust enforcement in health care markets. In Nelson v.
Monroe Regional Medical Center," plaintiffs, a "mildly retarded"
eighteen year-old woman and her mother, alleged, among other things,
that a merger between the Monroe Clinic and the Monroe Medical
Center-the only two health care facilities in Monroe, Wisconsin, a
small, rural community-had allowed those providers to monopolize the
market for medical services in Monroe and its environs, thereby injuring
plaintiffs and violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 In
particular, plaintiffs claimed that the merger substantially increased
concentration in the health care market in Monroe; that the merged
facility, which had cared for plaintiffs in the past, refused to treat them
post merger, except on an emergency basis, in retaliation for their
having filed a malpractice action against one of the clinic's physicians;
and that this refusal of treatment forced plaintiffs to travel forty
miles-to Madison, Wisconsin-to receive care. The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this antitrust
claim on the grounds that the clinic's refusal to treat plaintiffs was "not
an injury cognizable under the antitrust laws." 3
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case for trial. In its view, by allegedly reducing output-denying nonemergency care to plaintiffs--defendants' merger had
injured plaintiffs in a manner directly relevant to the purpose of the
antitrust laws. The merged entity would no longer care for plaintiffs,
and they had no other convenient source of care. "Monopolists," said the
court, "are more likely to turn away prospective clients because they do
not feel the same competitive pressure to serve all comers." 4 Concur-

11. 925 F.2d 1555 (7th Cir. 1991).
12. Id. at 1561. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, prohibits "(e)very contract,
combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce among the several
States." Section 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, punishes those who "shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize.., any part of the trade or commerce among the several States."
13. 925 F.2d at 1562. Private actions to enforce the antitrust laws are authorized by
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, which provides that "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefore." See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473 (1982). Antitrust
standing differs from standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, in that
antitrust plaintiffs must also prove that their injury is the kind that the antitrust laws
seek to prevent, that is, an injury to competition. For a discussion of antitrust standing,
see Associated Gen, Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 535 (1983). For a discussion distinguishing standing under Article III of the
Constitution from standing under the antitrust laws, see Sanner v. Board of Trade, 62 F.3d
918 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. 925 F.2d at 1564.
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ring, Judge Cudahy observed that plaintiffs had suffered "the very
essence of antitrust injury. Although perhaps not a matter of major
moment in dollars and cents, the merger and the related refusal to deal
strike at the very heart of the evils addressed by the antitrust laws." 5
The federal government was not a party in Nelson, and no one sought
to undo the merger. The opinion, as I mentioned, is not cited very often
and has attracted little scholarly attention. But it demonstrates, more
poignantly than academic debates about the exercise of market power,
how mergers-even those that create significant potential for cost
savings-can harm some health care consumers even as they benefit the
majority. Thus, while the Nelsons may have been atypical in some
ways-the daughter was mildly retarded, and perhaps the mother was
unreasonably litigious; in others they were paradigmatic victims of
health care consohdation-"high maintenance" patients, unprofitable to
treat, time-consuming, and more demanding than most.
By placing the Nelsons' inability to receive treatment at the "heart" of
antitrust, Judge Cudahy drew what was doubtless an unintentional
distinction, but a meaningful one nonetheless. As noted earlier, courts,
commentators, public agencies, and the business community have lately
come to view the antitrust laws almost exclusively in terms of economic
efficiency. Under these terms, if business transactions offer the promise
of lower average prices for the relevant community of consumers, they
are likely to pass antitrust muster, regardless of their social or political
implications and despite their adverse impact on isolated groups of
disadvantaged consumers. Judge Cudahy's reference to antitrust's
"heart" not only implies that the laws have economic concerns at their
core, but also suggests that they have "emotional," socio-political components, in addition to the more obvious rational and economic ones. For
him, it was not enough that the merger in Monroe may have lowered
prices for most consumers, because it also created a firm with the power
to exclude "undesirables" from the market altogether. Nelson implicitly
recognizes that even though mergers and other forms of competitor
collaboration can achieve important benefits for the majority of
consumers, they can also create providers that can safely ignore the
needs of the uninsured and the hard-to-treat. 6
15. Id. at. 1568 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
16. Id. According to a report released on December 20, 1995 by Georgia State
University's Center for Risk Management and Insurance Research, Georgia is among the
states with the highest percentage of residents under 65 years of age who have no health
insurance. Eighteen percent of Georgians under 65 have no health insurance, compared
to 20% of Floridians, 20%.of Mississippians, 21% of Louisianans, 22% of Alabamians, 23%
of Californians, 26% of New Mexicans, and 27% of Texans. 4 BNA HEALTH CARE POLICY
REPORT (Jan.26, 1996).
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In today's health care markets, however, the sentiments expressed in
Nelson seem anomalous. The related economic concerns of cost and
efficiency dominate the national debate about health care. A national
consensus holds that health care costs are too high and that something
must be done to lower them. The private market's answer has been to
compete as never before. Driven by newly-powerful managed care groups
to reduce their prices, hospitals, physicians, prescription manufacturers,
and other providers are merging, expanding, and collaborating in
unprecedented fashion. The federal government seems on the verge of
major Medicare and Medicaid reform.
Understandably, the rapid pace of these momentous changes has
provoked anxiety in many quarters. Afraid of being left behind and
eager to compete at full tilt, some incumbents oppose any constraints on
consolidation. Others, equally fearful but more risk averse, would like
to keep their more aggressive rivals from disturbing the economic status
quo. These shared fears have led industry lobbyists representing the
market's most powerful incumbents--organized medicine, hospital
associations, and pharmaceutical groups-to unite against a common
enemy, the federal antitrust laws. Convinced that antitrust doctrine is
too vague to provide sufficient guidance to the business community, that
federal agencies do not appreciate the "special" characteristics of health
care markets, and that the decisions of federal courts and agencies are
so capricious that they deter providers from embarking on socially useful
collaborations, these lobbyists have complained long and loud to the
antitrust enforcement agencies, Congress,17 and state legislatures."'
These efforts have borne fruit. Since 1992, approximately twenty
states have enacted laws intended to exempt health care providers from

17. The most recent effort at federal legislative reform, is H.R. 2925, the "Antitrust
Health Care Advancement Act of 1996," introduced on February 1, 1996. It provides in
substance that the rule of reason shall apply to exchanges among health care providers of
information regarding "costs, sales, profitability, marketing, prices, or fees," provided that
the exchange is reasonably related to "establishing a health care provider network." H.R.
2925, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(1). By securing the application of the "rule of reason" to these
kinds of provider arrangements, this legislation would depart from traditional antitrust
analysis, by replacing the "strong" per se rule (that condemns collective price-fixing efforts
without inquiry into their purpose or effect) with the weaker rule of reason (that permits
that kind of inquiry). For a fuller discussion of these analytical alternatives, see National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
18. 'The hospital industry and others in the health care sector have actively sought the
enactment of state laws that would grant immunity from federal and state antitrust
enforcement actions related to mergers, joint ventures, and other agreements that could

fall under the antitrust statutes." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUS. No. GAOiHEHS94220, HEALTH CARE-FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY (Aug. 5, 1994).
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federal antitrust law. Some of these statutes, often called "provider
cooperation laws," apply only to rural health care providers; while most
apply to all providers, many have been enacted in states with large rural
populations and will have a significant impact on rural markets. Each
law substitutes a state regulatory regime for federal oversight and seeks
to immunize from federal liability mergers, joint ventures, and other
provider agreements that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.
Two premises underlie these state reform measures. The first
presumes that the federal antitrust laws prevent efficiency-enhancing
collaborations and that, by displacing the federal regime, states can
encourage health care firms to generate cost savings that they in turn
will pass on to consumers. The second presumes that rural markets in
particular will benefit from the continued presence of their "traditional"
health care providers now threatened with extinction and that provider
cooperation laws will resuscitate firms that would otherwise perish.
These are laudable goals, but they are ill conceived and mutually
inconsistent. As I shall argue in the following pages, these new laws are
unresponsive to the major problems of rural communities, unnecessary
to facilitate provider cooperation, and administratively unworkable.
They benefit existing, inefficient providers and work against the
emergence of new forms of health care. They threaten to harm
consumers, especially "marginal" ones. Moreover, the appearance of
these laws coincides with two developments that seem to make antitrust
reform superfluous. Since 1993, federal agencies have gone to extraordinary lengths to spell out their enforcement policies in the health care
field and to assure health care providers that the large majority of their
collaborative efforts will pass unchallenged. At the same time, federal
courts have substantially changed their view of health care markets,
effectively making it much more difficult for enforcement agencies to
bring successful challenges to mergers and joint ventures.
II.

THE CHANGING HEALTHCARE MARKETPLACE

In the past ten years, an outbreak of competition has dramatically
altered the shape of health care markets in this country. Hospitals in
general, and public hospitals in particular, have come under severe
pressure to lower costs.19 The growing bargaining power of managedcare plans, along with the public clamor to reduce health care expenditures, have forced hospitals to compete in order to survive. 20 Large

19. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Our Ailing Public Hospitals: Cure Them or Close
Them?, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1348 (Nov. 16, 1995).
20. Glenn Simpson, U.S. Says Hospitals, Doctors in 2 Areas Tried to Block ManagedCare Providers,WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1995, at AS.
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employers and other well-organized groups have become informed and
aggressive buyers, pitting hospital against hospital and demanding and
obtaining discounted rates for the full range of hospital services. Even
nonprofit health insurers are merging so they can compete effectively for
large managed-care contracts. 21
At the same time, doctors and allied health care providers have
intensified earlier efforts to compete directly with hospitals in areas of
potential profitability.
They have formed health care networks,
established free-standing laboratory and diagnostic facilities, opened
emergency care centers, and developed outpatient surgery clinics.
Because these outpatient facilities are smaller and less expensive to
operate than hospitals-having fewer employees, lower fixed costs, and
no community service obligations-their owners can concentrate on
providing a single service efficiently, finding inexpensive locations in
relatively affluent neighborhoods, and pricing their services at levels
much lower than hospitals can bear.22
Hospitals have responded to these unsettling developments in a
variety of ways. Some have cut costs drastically. Others have opened
their own outpatient facilities or moved into new product and geographic
markets. 23 Still others have formed alliances with health care net-

The growth of managed-plans in recent years has injected unprecedented
competition into the health care industry, with national giants aggressively
cutting prices to penetrate new markets. According to one study, by year end
some 80% of the health-care market will consist of managed-care plans. The
managed-care companies themselves, health-maintenance organizations, are
highly profitable, squeezing most of the savings from physicians and hospitals.
Id.
21. See, e.g., Robert Tomsho, Blue Cross Plansin Texas, Illinois Intend to Merge, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 31, 1996, at B3. (The article reports that Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans face
"increasing pressure from for-profit insurers and health-maintenance organizations in the
tumultuous race to land managed-care contracts." Since last fall, Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plans in Cincinnati and Indianapolis have merged, as well as a pair of plans in Tennessee;
six plans in New England have formed a joint venture in anticipation of their eventual
merger. Nationwide, since 1985 the number of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans has decreased
from 86 to 66.)
22. See, e.g., Esther B. Fein, Future for Health Care: Upscale Medical Clinics, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1996, at Bi.
Outpatient settings are cheaper places to treat people because there is not the
same overhead for expensive services like round-the-clock nursing, operating
theaters and kitchens that figure into the cost of care in a hospital. "If you had
to think of what would be the worst place to provide accessible, ambient, efficient
primary care it would be a hospital," said Dr. Robert G. Newman, president and
chief executive of Beth Israel Medical Center.
23. See, e.g., id. ("As hospitals have seen inpatient revenues steadily erode, they have
begun sprucing up and expanding outpatient services," a trend that is the "result of fierce
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works. Over the past two years, hospital mergers have proceeded at a
dizzying pace,24 consolidating the industry in significant measure, while
leaving unaffiliated hospitals at substantial competitive disadvantage.
Those unable to adapt have been left to perform increasingly unprofitable services on a sicker and under-insured patient population.
In addition to these powerful competitive pressures, hospitals face the
prospect of drastically reduced funding from Medicare and Medicaid.25
Congressional leaders continue to quibble over the exact size of what
most agree will be a sizeable cut in projected Medicare spending over the
next seven years, approximately one-fourth of which will come directly
from lower payments to hospitals. Further cuts are anticipated for
services such as home health agencies, which many hospitals own. If
this first round of reductions yields insufficient savings, Congress may
reduce Medicare payments to hospitals even further.
Congress has also proposed lowering Medicaid funding by approximately $182 billion. If this proposal is enacted and if states respond
predictably, by refusing to allocate additional funds for their Medicaid
programs or tightening eligibility rules and lowering payment levels, the
ranks of the uninsured will swell and more will likely turn to hospitals
as providers of last resort. In earlier, precompetitive times, many
hospitals cross-subsidized the costs of uncompensated care by including
those costs in the rates charged to private insurers. But in the current
climate, private payers are unwilling to tolerate higher prices for their
insureds in order to subsidize those unable to pay for care. Therefore,
hospitals committed to serving the disadvantaged must absorb more of
those costs, stretching their thin financial resources closer to the
breaking point. "The question," according to a senior vice president at
the American Hospital Association, "isn'twhether hospitals will close but
which ones."26 The answer seems painfully obvious.
These developments have aggravated problems brewing for years. For
nearly a decade, hospitals have been closing at the rate of approximately
fifty per year. Analysts predict that this rate could double or triple as
competitive and financial pressures intensify.2 7 Hospital utilization is

competition in the medical industry, where managed-care companies emphasizing
preventive and outpatient care have waged a relentless drive to cut costs.").

24. See discussion infra parts V and VII.
25. See, e.g., Letters to the Editor: Will ChurchInsure Your Grocery Cart, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 22, 1996, at A13. The question of whether the funding proposals now before Congress
constitute true "reductions" or simply a paring down of future growth has become a
political and semantic issue of some controversy.
26. See Laurie McGinley, Acute Pain: Retooling of Medicare, Medicaid Will Increase

Pressureon Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, Al.
27. Id.
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also decreasing. Admissions, average length of stay, and inpatient days
per one thousand people have all dropped significantly in the past five
years" while occupancy rates are at their lowest level in decades.2'
Though these changes affect all of the nation's 5100 hospitals, rural
hospitals suffer disproportionately. According to the American Hospital
Association ("AHA"), the most financially fragile hospitals-some 1600
in number-are those deriving 75% or more of their patient volume from
Medicare and Medicaid. Rural hospitals, especially smaller ones,
comprise a large share of this number and are therefore "most at risk of
closure." °
A recent study of rural hospitals with 50 or fewer beds found that
there are 1041 such hospitals in this country-approximately 18% of all
general hospitals and a "major portion" of rural hospitals. Statistics
compiled by the AHA indicate that 389 rural hospitals closed between
1980 and 1992; two-thirds closed after 1987.1 Community health
status may be the most immediate casualty of those closures, but the
financial plight of rural hospitals jeopardizes more than just access to
health care. Because the rural hospital is one of the largest employers
in its community, its continued existence is critical to local economic
of jobs, but also in the wider competition to
vitality, not only as a source
32
attract new business.

28. See MUTUAL OF OMAHA INS. CO., CURRENT TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS &
UTILIZATION (1993 & 1995 eds.).
29. See Witnesses at FTC Examine Analysis of Efficiencies in Health Care Sector, 69
Antitrust & Trade Reg, Rep. (BNA) No. 1737, at 550 (Nov. 9, 1995) (testimony of Richard
L. Scott before FTC). For hospitals nationwide, the average occupancy rate is approximately 64%; in many rural areas, of course, the rate is much lower.
30. See David E. Berry & John W. Seavey, Assuring Access to Rural Health Services:
The Case for Revitalizing Small Rural Hospitals, HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV., Mar.
22, 1994, at 32.
31. Fred Bayles, Rural Hospitals Turn to Innovation to Survive as Hundreds Close
Doors to Medicine, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at A28.
32. California law, for example, expressly recognizes the role played by rural hospitals
in community development. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14132.77(c) n. § 1 (1995):
The rural hospital is often one of the largest employers in the community. The
closure of such a hospital means the loss of an employer and negative economic
impact beyond the health sector. Further, economic development of a rural area
is, in part, tied to the existence of a hospital. For example, people tend to retire
to areas where there is reasonable access to physician and hospital-based services.
In a similar vein, a report commissioned by the Greater New York Hospital Association
estimates that pending proposals to cut federal health care spending by $452 billion over
the next seven years would curb the growth of both jobs and personal income across the
entire United States economy. According to the report, implementation of the proposed
budget cuts would result, over the next seven years, in the creation of 2.3 million fewer jobs
and a reduction in personal income of 1.7%. Ron Winslow, Health.CareStudy Looks at
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The findings, of the AHA study mirror conclusions reached by statesponsored inquiries focusing on rural hospitals. Among its major
findings, a 1989 study prepared for the Minnesota legislature reported
that (1) between 1985 and 1987, five rural hospitals closed, 4% of all
Minnesota hospitals; (2) twelve other rural hospitals were in "precarious
financial condition"; and (3) many other rural hospitals were "financially
vulnerable" and could be forced to close. The study also found that small
rural hospitals were "especially hard hit" during the study period-admissions fell 27%, patient days fell 36%, and the average
occupancy rate dropped from 32% to 21%. 3' Moreover, it seems likely
that in the decade since the study period, prospects for rural hospitals
have worsened. 4 A Florida study undertaken in 1993 reported that
half of the state's statutory rural hospitals were in financial difficulty. 5
Hospitals are not the only health care providers to feel the effects of
the changing marketplace. Physicians complain publicly about the
"problematic" financial incentives that accompany the widespread
growth of aggressive managed-care arrangements-the doctors' loss of
independence, the disincentives to refer patients to specialists, and the
risk-selection process by which large HMOs seek to attract healthy

Impact of Spending Cuts, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at B6.
33. See M. Miller & M. Casey, Minnesota Department of Health, Health Systems
Development Division, Health Economics Program-Accessto Hospital Services in Rural
Minnesota, 73 MINN. MED. 1, 35-39 (Jan. 1990).
34. Local evidence of this continuing decline appears in the findings of fact set forth in
United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995). Analyzing the
legality of a merger between two hospitals in Dubuque, Iowa, the court examined whether
patients of those hospitals could turn to others in the "relevant geographic market," in the
event that the merged entity attempted to raise prices. In determining the boundaries of
the "relevant geographic market," the court found that there were seven "rural hospitals"
in the area of Dubuque:
Galena-Stauss Hospital in Galena, Illinois ...has 25 licensed beds and an
average daily census of 3. Southwest Health Center in Platteville, Wisconsin...
has 35 licensed beds and an average daily census of 11. Lancaster Memorial
Hospital in Lancaster, Wisconsin ...has 35 licensed beds and an average daily
census of 10. Delaware County Memorial Hospital in Manchester, Iowa ...has
58 licensed beds and an average daily census of 12. Jackson County Public
Hospital in Maquoketa, Iowa ...has 99 licensed beds and an average daily census
of 12.4. Guttenberg Memorial Hospital in Guttenberg, Iowa... has 37 licensed
beds and an average daily census of 7. Finally, Central Community Hospital in
Elkader, Iowa... has 29 licensed beds and an average daily census of 3-4.
Id. at 971. Taken as a group, these hospitals have an average occupancy rate of 19%.
35. See Bruce D. Platt, A Summary of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of
1993: FloridaBlazes the Trail, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 483, 497 n.122 (1993) (citing staff
analysis prepared for state legislative committee on health care).
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members and discourage the less healthy from joining." Moreover,
many rural counties suffer from a serious shortage of doctors. In
Missouri, for example, almost half the state's counties, many of them
rural, have been designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas by
the Federal Public Health Service; six counties have no primary care
physician whatsoever. 7 Rural counties in Florida have approximately
half as many physicians per resident as urban counties. 8 Indeed, the
scope of the problem is hemispheric; a 1995 report by the Canadian
Health Ministry stated that "physicians are leaving rural Ontario
hospitals in droves."39
III.

THE STATE RESPONSE TO CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS:
ANTITRUST REFORM

Because of the threat they pose to the survival of rural communities,
the problems in rural health care have naturally attracted many

responses and provoked much finger pointing. To many, the troubles of
rural markets mirror those of the wider marketplace and are thought to
require systemic legal reform. Although most people concerned about
solving these problems recognize that their causes are deep-seated and
numerous, some powerful interest groups have nevertheless singled out
certain supposed causal factors for particularly harsh criticism.
Prominent among the alleged culprits is federal antitrust policy.
Over the past twenty years, a chorus of representatives from the
hospital industry, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and organized
medicine have charged that federal antitrust laws and the agencies that
enforce them have prevented health care providers from adapting
efficiently to the many changes affecting their industry. Industry
spokespeople have claimed that federal enforcement, especially in the

36. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (Dec. 21, 1995). "The recent
marriage of profit-making and managed care portends momentous changes in medicine."
Id. at 1707.
37. Richard Orr, Health-Care Reform Proposals Don't Address Shortage of Rural
Doctors, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 27, 1994, at M3.
38. See Platt, supra note 35, at 497 n.122. These shortages would likely be exacerbated
if a pending immigration bill becomes law. Under the measure, employers hiring foreign
recruits would be required to pay a tax of $10,000 or 10% of the recruit's first-year salary,
whichever is greater, a requirement that would, among other things, further handicap the
efforts of rural areas-many of which rely heavily on foreign-born doctors to staff their
hospitals-to attract physicians. See Almar Latour, How CurbingImmigrationCould Hurt
Health Care in Inner Cities, Rural Areas, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1996, at Bi.
39. Leslie Papp, Put Rural Doctors on Salary to Bridge Pay Gap, Grier Says, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 7, 1995, at All.
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areas of hospital mergers and physician joint ventures, has been
overzealous, erratic, and unpredictable. 4' They have regularly urged
enforcement agencies to take a more benign view of industry consolidation, 4 petitioned Congress for statutory exemptions from the antitrust
laws, and lobbied state legislatures for "antitrust reform."42
In response to these efforts, since 1992 more than twenty states have
enacted legislation enabling health care providers to cooperate with one
another or consolidate their operations in ways that might otherwise
violate the federal antitrust laws.4" In one form or another, these
statutes seek to shield provider collaboration from federal scrutiny by
taking advantage of the so-called state-action doctrine, a common law
construct immunizing certain state-regulated activity from antitrust
liability.44 Under that doctrine, if a state legislature announces a clear

40. See, e.g., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust Policy
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER, Nov. 1992.

41. See, e.g., FTC Should Revise Antitrust Analysis to Recognize Efficiencies by
Hospitals,69 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rpt. (BNA) No. 1738, at 583 (Nov. 16, 1995) (testimony
of Joe Sims before FTC Hearing on Global & Innovation-Based Competition).
42. Organized medicine, for example, continues to seek exemptions that would permit
doctors to negotiate prices collectively with third-party payors. See discussion supra at
n.17 of the "Antitrust Health Care Advancement Act of 1996." Pharmaceutical manufacturers and hospitals have sought comparable exemptions. See JusticeDepartmentAnnounces
It Would ChallengePharmaceuticalManufacturersAssociationProposal,BUSINESS REVIEW
LETTER, Oct. 1, 1993, availablein 1993 DOJBRL LEXIS 20 (Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Department of Justice, to John R. Ferguson, Esq.
Swidler & Berlin, denying request of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association for
approval of plan to collectively set maximum prices for prescription drugs); see also supra
note 40.
43. Maine enacted its Hospital Cooperation Act in 1991, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 1883-88 (West Supp. 1993), and other states followed suit. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 25.5-1-501 to -516 (Bradford Supp. 1996) ("Hospital Efficiency and Cooperation Act");
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2911-.2921 (West Supp. 1994) ("antitrust exceptions" to the
"Health Care Cost Containment" law); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-17.5-01 to -12 (Miche
Butterworth Supp. 1995) ("Health Care Provider Cooperative Agreements"); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2950-2958 (McKinney Supp. 1997) ("Cooperative Programs and Networks
in Rural Areas"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 140.01-.03, 3727.21-.24 (Baldwin 1994)
("Agreement for acquisition or use of hospital facilities," and "Voluntary Cooperative
Agreements to Improve Health Care"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-1301 to -1309 (Miche
1996) ("Hospital Cooperation Act of 1993"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 314.001.008 (Vernon Supp. 1997) ("Cooperative Agreements Among Hospitals"); WASH REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.47.005-.115 (West Supp. 1994) ("Health Care Access Act").
44. First announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1953), the state-action
doctrine holds that the federal antitrust laws do not apply "to anticompetitive restraints
imposed by the States 'as an act of government.'" Thus, collective activity that would be
unlawful if undertaken by private actors is permitted when conducted by the state, or by
private actors if "first, the challenged restraint... [is] 'clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; [and] second, the policy... [is] 'actively supervised' by the State
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intention to displace competition with a regulatory regime or with statesanctioned cooperation among competitors, the state-sponsored
mechanism is immune from federal antitrust challenge provided that the
state actively supervises its workings.4 5
The range of activities covered by the various provider cooperation
laws differs substantially from state to state. Oregon's law, for example,
covers only hospital joint ventures related to heart and kidney transplant services; and each joint venture must include the state teaching

hospital as a paiticipant."

Minnesota's law, by comparison, covers a

wide array of providers and collaborative activities. 47 Some statutes
authorize immunity only for hospital joint ventures, others confer it on
joint ventures and mergers, and one--Georgia's-applies to mergers
only.48
The approval and review mechanisms established by the
various laws also differ significantly. In some states, the Attorney
General is the approving authority for proposed consolidations, but in
others, a state regulatory agency performs that function.49 Some states
have elaborate lists of relevant criteria that regulators must balance in
the approval process, 0 and others give the approval authority only the
most general kind of guidance."1

itself." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980). Because the antitrust laws embody a national policy committed to competition,
state-action immunity is "disfavored": in order to obtain it, the state regulatory program
must be "implemented in its specific details" to assure that the anticompetitive scheme is
truly the state's and not that of private parties. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,
633 (1992).
45. For a fuller discussion of the state-action doctrine, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 676 (1994).

Other scholars have questioned whether particular efforts at state reform will pass muster
under the state-action doctrine. See, e.g., Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned
Provider CollaborationAfter Ticor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 421-23 (1994); James F.
Blumstein, National Health Care Reform on Trial, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1504-05
(1994); Ilene Gotts, Health Care Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws; A Guardedly
Optimistic Prognosis, 10 J. CON. HEALTH L. & POLy 169 (1994). While this question is
both interesting and important, especially in light of the United States Supreme Court's
recent elaboration of the state-action doctrine in Ticor, this paper proceeds on the
assumption that the new laws can achieve the desired immunity, but asks instead whether
that immunity is necessary to permit the kind of useful collaboration most conducive to
consumer welfare.
46. See 1993 OR. LAWS § 14, ch. 769.
47. See The Minnesota Integrated Service Network Act, 1993 MINN. STAT. ANN. 62N. 11
(West 1996).
48. See 1993 Ga. Laws 1020 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72.1 (1996)).
49. Compare Idaho, for example, with Washington.
50. See, e.g., Health Care Cooperation Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-560 (Law. Co-op.
1994) (listing, without limitation, twenty separate factors for agency consideration).
51. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72.1 (1996).
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As mentioned earlier, some of the new laws apply only to rural health
care providers. Florida's statute is an example. Its announced intent is
to "foster the development of rural health networks"52 by encouraging
the consolidation of hospital services and technologies and other kinds
of cooperative arrangements among rural providers "when such
arrangements improve the quality of health care and moderate cost
increases.""3 To this end, the law acknowledges that it is replacing
"competitive market forces ... with state regulation," establishing an
agency review process for proposed consolidations and cooperative
agreements, and declaring that the statutory scheme is designed to
protect state-approved transactions from the federal antitrust laws.54
In addition to Florida, several other states-New York, Washington,
Colorado, and Kansas-have passed statutes permitting rural health
care providers to collaborate and consolidate free of the constraints
imposed by federal antitrust law.55 Though phrased differently, the
statutes all express concern about the detrimental effects of unregulated
competition on rural consumers. The New York legislature, for example,
found that "changes in reimbursement policies, the emergence of
alternate service providers, and public pressure to control health care
costs" have had a "particularly severe impact on rural health care
delivery" and threaten seriously to "reduce access to quality health care
services by individuals in rural environs."s In a similar vein, the
Washington legislature declared that it is not "cost-effective, practical,
or desirable to provide quality health and hospital care services in rural

52. FLA. STAT. ch. 381.04065(1) (1995). The Act defines a "rural health network" as a
"non-profit legal entity, consisting of rural and urban health care providers and others, that
is organized to plan and deliver health care services on a cooperative basis in a rural area."
FLA. STAT. ch. 381.04065(2)(C) (1995). It defines a "rural" area as "one with a population
density of less than 100 individuals per square mile or an area defined by the most recent
United States Census as rural." FLA. STAT. ch. 381.04065(2Xa) (1995).
53. FLA. STAT. ch. 381.04065 (1995).
54. Id. See also Washington Health Service Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300-.310
(1994):
The legislature finds that purchasers of health care services and health care
coverage do not have adequate information upon which to base purchasing
decisions; that health care facilities and providers of health care services face legal
and market disincentives to develop economies of scale or to provide the most costefficient and cost-efficacious service; that health insurers, contractors, and health
maintenance organizations face market disincentives in providing health care
coverage to those Washington residents with the most need for health care
coverage; and that potential competitors in the provision of health care coverage
bear unequal burdens in entering the market for health care coverage.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(1) (1994).
55. See supra note 43.
56. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2950(1), (2) (Consol. 1994) ("Legislative Findings").
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areas on a competitive basis because of limited patient volume and
geographic isolation."57
Provider cooperation laws have already attracted criticism from a
variety of quarters. Some scholars doubt whether, in design or practice,
they will satisfy the criteria of the state-action doctrine.58 Some also
question the wisdom of reviving state regulatory regimes for health care
providers, in light of the general failings of the certificate-of-need
programs popular in the 1970s and early 1980s."9 Still others see the
laws as a misguided exercise in "interest group appeasement."0
I, too, am critical of provider cooperation laws, but for different
reasons. In my view, antitrust reform has little relevance to the
problems facing poor rural communities and is unnecessary to foster the
kind of consolidation that the laws hope to encourage. Moreover, if a
regulatory model is thought more conducive than a competitive one to
the achievement of lower costs and continued service, states should
regulate the prices and services of all providers, not the structures of
episodic consolidations. Finally, the premise that state antitrust reform
is necessary to counteract the inhibitory effect exerted by the federal
antitrust laws on efficient mergers and joint ventures runs counter to
the facts. A consolidation movement is sweeping the healthcare
industry; more mergers and joint ventures have occurred in the past two
years than ever before, seemingly undeterred by either federal enforcement policy or the supposed ambiguity of antitrust doctrine. In fact,
from the perspectives of both policy and law, health care antitrust law
has lately moved decidedly in the direction of permitting ever larger
degrees of provider and payor consolidation.
A. Antitrust Reform Will Not Solve the Important Problems Facing
Rural Markets
By all accounts, the critical health problem confronting rural
communities is the loss of access to care, a problem especially acute in
areas with large Medicare and Medicaid populations. Communities at
greatest risk typically have one hospital, under-utilized and on the brink
of financial failure, and a few elderly physicians nearing retirement.

57. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.44.450 (1995) ("Notes; Intent").
58. See supra note 45.
59. See Blumstein, supra note 45. For a discussion of the failings of those programs,
see Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services By "Certificate of
Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973); James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning
and Regulation Through Certificateof Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3.
60. Thomas L. Greaney, When Law and PoliticsCollide: Why Health CareReform Does
Not Need Antitrust "Reform," 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 135, 136 (1994).
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These communities are unable to attract new physicians and fear, with
good cause, that when the older ones retire their hospitals will close and
their residents will need to travel long distances, if they are able to do
so, to receive medical treatment.
These are serious problems, but not the kind that concern antitrust
enforcement agencies. Antitrust law chiefly seeks to prevent the unfair
accumulation and abuse of market power s ' and, thus, to preserve for
consumers the lowest possible prices, highest possible output, and
broadest range of products (or services) and quality. To these ends, the
law proscribes combinations that restrain trade 2 and mergers that
might lessen competition or create a monopoly." Hospitals in rural
communities facing acute health care crises are closing, not merging, and
are impotent, not powerful. With high vacancy rates and aging facilities,
they present an unattractive picture to potential merger partners. By
the same token, physicians in those communities are retiring, not
forming joint ventures. Cooperative provider activity is simply not
occurring, and individual activity is on the verge of shutting down.
Moreover, rural communities are not populous enough to realize the
full range of competitive benefits possible from the formation of health
care networks. A study in The New England Journalof Medicine found
that consumers buying service from health care networks realize the
largest amount of competitive benefit-the lowest prices and the greatest
range of choice-when they live in a market with three or more
competing networks. The study also found, however, that only forty-two
percent of the United States population lives in markets sizeable enough
to support three efficient full-service provider networks. Twenty-nine
percent of the population, those in less populated areas, reside in
markets capable of supporting no more than one such network."
Because federal antitrust enforcement agencies have never challenged
collaborative efforts to resurrect dying markets and have no intention of

61. Market power is generally defined as the ability to raise price above competitive
levels without losing sales sufficient to make the price rise unprofitable. For a full
discussion of the role of market power in antitrust analysis, see George A. Hay, Market
Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807 (1992). Hay states that "[tihe concept of market
power is at the core of antitrust." Id. at 807.
62. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), proscribes "[elvery contract,
combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."
63. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988), prohibits any merger or

acquisition the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly," in any line of commerce in any section of the country.

64. Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health CareReform: The Demographic.
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 148 (Jan. 14, 1993).
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doing so now,65 the immunity bestowed by provider cooperation laws is
irrelevant to many rural communities. And because many rural areas
are too small to support competitive markets, 66 provider cooperation
laws are unlikely to increase the range of choice available to their
residents. Immunizing nonexistent mergers and small-scale joint
ventures from antitrust scrutiny will neither supply the funding nor
create the cost savings necessary for the survival of small-town
providers. Other initiatives-fostering the development of purchasing
cooperatives, for example-might help rural hospitals reduce costs and
achieve some scale economies, but antitrust reform is no solution to the
deep-seated financial problems plaguing rural health care.
At bottom, of course, the critical issue is funding. The communities
most at risk of losing their provider base lack the resources either to
support existing providers or attract new ones. They cannot afford to
maintain health care services at previous levels, but at the same time
they cannot bear to close them down. States could subsidize these
services directly on the premise that, for reasons of social policy, rural
health care should continue to exist in its present form despite its
unprofitability. But direct subsidies are not popular in the current
political climate, and their enactment, in any event, would likely entail
a difficult and painful debate about the political and mythic importance
of the countryside and the economic wisdom of supporting institutions
that cannot support themselves, topics too sensitive for most legislatures
to tackle openly.6" Seen from this vantage point, the provider cooperation laws may represent a politically expedient, albeit empty, gesture to
rural constituencies.
In a strong sense, moreover, rural health care problems are a subset
of the larger problem of health care for indigents. They are not special,
unique, or more deserving of attention than the health care needs of
other indigent communities. People of means, regardless of where they
live, will almost always receive tolerably good health care. Poor people,
no matter where they live, will almost always lack tolerable health care.
In my opinion, we have a societal obligation of the highest importance
to care for the basic needs of all indigent people, regardless of their

65. See discussion infra part VI (regardingjoint Statements of Enforcement Policy and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 164-71 (discussing MarshfieldClinic and natural
monopoly markets).
67. This debate, moreover, would embrace many aspects of rural economic life, from
farm subsidies to health care to universal access to developing communications systems
to mass transportation.
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residence. But this obligation is no more pronounced in the case of poor
rural communities than in the case of poor urban ones.
B. Legislative Efforts to Preserve FailingRural HospitalsAre
Themselves Doomed to Fail
Many of the provider cooperation laws are animated by a desire to
preserve existing institutions in their current form and location. They
explicitly instruct state regulators reviewing applications for cooperative
agreements to consider as a benefit of a proposed collaboration the
prospect that "a hospital, if any, and health care facilities that customarily serve the communities in the area [affected by the agreement]...
will be preserved."' Though doubtless well intentioned, the goal of
preserving rural health care institutions will likely prove impossible to
accomplish at reasonable cost and could constitute an impediment to
useful changes in rural health care markets.
Compared to potential alternatives, rural hospitals are very expensive
to operate. They own large buildings with expensive equipment, offer a
wide range of services, staff a large number of beds, and employ a
relatively large workforce. As an historical artifact, this is understandable; for several generations hospital construction was subsidized by one
federal program,69 while hospital services and equipment purchases
were subsidized by others. The federal subsidies have largely ended,
though, and many of their former beneficiaries are now drastically
under-utilized and very unprofitable.
Smaller outpatient clinics and mobile diagnostic and treatment
facilities could doubtless perform many services offered by these
hospitals at a fraction of the cost.7" Free-standing emergency care
centers can offer low cost substitutes to hospital emergency rooms.
Indeed, larger medical clinics and hospitals from big cities have begun
to open satellite offices in rural areas-partly to serve patients on site,
but mainly as a referral source for their urban operations. 71 Video
teleconferencing enables entrepreneurial specialists to provide consultation and treatment to patients nearly three hundred miles from their

68. Wis. STAT. § 150.85(4)(b)(2) (1994).
69. See Kenneth R. Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health
Facilities, 23 B.C. L. REV. 577 (1982).
70. See Fein, supra note 22.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 144-54 (Mercy Health Systems discussion).
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offices.72 Given the current rate of technological and organizational
change, additional options must lie just over the horizon.73
If the experience of other markets offers any insights about the future
of health care, we can be cautiously optimistic that providers will
probably find less expensive ways of serving rural populations.
Preserving old, expensive, unprofitable hospitals is a nostalgic notion
with a high price tag and is incompatible with a desire to lower costs.
Moreover, unless the new generation of less expensive providers is not
actively prevented from entering rural markets, the efforts to preserve
older, high cost institutions are bound to fail. Instead of fighting the
development of new health care arrangements and seeking vainly to
preserve the past, states should encourage new providers to enter rural
markets.74
There is a potential social cost, of course, associated with the
innovative economic efficiencies likely to develop in a more fullycompetitive rural health care market. Older, full-service hospitals may
be more expensive to operate than smaller, mobile outpatient facilities,
but their public ownership and public-mindedness have led them to offer
a wide range of services to the poor, the uninsured, and the unprofitable.
Privately owned facilities will be much less inclined, completely
disinclined, perhaps, to serve these populations without "adequate"
compensation; in markets without public providers, the private sector's
refusal to serve those populations would mean that they will go
unserved.
This is a difficult problem, but it has received almost no attention
from recent state reform legislation. Understandably, legislative lip
service is sometimes paid to the notion of preserving providers with longstanding community ties. And concern is repeatedly expressed for the
general goal of maintaining patient access. But no provisions are made
for funding public hospitals, converting them to lower-cost, free-standing
facilities, or assuring that the private sector will effectively pursue the

72. Bill Richards, Hold the Phone: Doctors Can Diagnose Illnesses Long Distance, To
the Dismay of Some, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at Al.
73. For a glimpse of the future, see G. Bruce Knecht, Click! Doctorto PostPatientFiles
on Net, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at Bi (describing the efforts of a West Virginia doctor
to load his patients' records onto the Internet, and the various benefits that he believes will
ensue).
74. This encouragement can take a variety of forms: seed money for new providers; a
state-run bidding process for the right to serve small (natural monopoly) rural markets,
coupled with conditions requiring service for the uninsured; state-provided transportation
to tertiary care centers for patients needing advanced care who are unable to transport
themselves.
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public goal of providing necessary health care to those who cannot afford
to buy it.
Some older forms of state regulation have attempted more directly to
address this problem. For example, Maryland's all-payer rate-setting
program, in effect since 1974, has drawn praise for controlling costs and
maintaining quality of care, while simultaneously expanding access to
services for the uninsured. 75 Pervasive regulatory efforts, like Maryland's, are not without problems, and their large bureaucracies and
disregard for market dynamics would almost certainly disqualify them
from serious consideration in today's political climate. But they are
attentive to the social value of universal health care, an attentiveness
notably absent from the recent efforts at antitrust reform.
IV.

PROVIDER COOPERATION LAWS AFFORD LITTLE PROTECTION FROM
ANTICOMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS

Of course, rural markets are not all alike. Some may have more than
one hospital, and others may have a relatively large number of
physicians. In numerical terms, it is unclear whether these more
vibrant markets constitute a significant portion of rural markets
generally. It is also unclear whether the competitive and financial forces
jeopardizing the survival of sole-provider markets pose an equally grave
threat to multiprovider communities. It is clear, though, that some
multiprovider, rural markets present possibilities for competitor
collaboration that are nonexistent in smaller markets. In these
multiprovider communities, health care entities may not confront the
prospect of near-term extinction and may reasonably contemplate
merging or collaborating with their competitors for a variety of reasons
both good and bad.
The explicit premise of the provider cooperation laws is that immunity
from the federal antitrust laws is necessary to encourage useful and
efficient forms of provider collaboration. The unspoken premise is that
all efforts at collaboration are useful and efficient. From the perspective
of health care consumers, this is a dangerous presumption. The blanket
approval of all efforts at competitor collaboration would threaten
consumers with higher prices, reduced services, or both. The review
processes created by the new laws, however, promise to approve every
proposal they encounter.
Florida's law, for example, places no effective barriers in the way of
provider collaboration. After receiving a proposed agreement from

75. See Gerard F. Anderson, All-Payer Ratesetting:Down but not Out, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV., Jan. 1991, at 35-41.
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would-be collaborators, the state's Agency for Health Care Administration must decide whether "the likely benefits resulting from the
agreement outweigh any disadvantages attributable to any potential
reduction in competition resulting from the agreement."76 The agency
must approve the proposal if it "reduces or moderates costs" and satisfies
any of the following criteria:
(a) consolidates services or facilities in a market area used by rural
health network patients to avoid duplication;
(b) promotes cooperation between rural health network members in the
market area;
(c) encourages cost-sharing among rural health network facilities;
(d) enhances the quality of rural health care; or
(e) improves utilization of rural health resources and equipment.77
Read literally, the statutory language suggests that if a proposal
promises to reduce or moderate cost in any amount, no matter how
small, it will pass the first procedural hurdle. But every merger and
joint venture can plausibly offer to reduce some cost by aggregating
purchasing power or eliminating overlapping personnel. The prospect of
realizing these simple economies is one of the motivations for all
mergers, but has special significance in hospital markets, where excess
capacity in the form of overbedding and duplicative technology is a
common fact of industry life. Because every collaboration, regardless of
its impact on consumers, can honestly promise to achieve some
efficiency, the first part of the Florida test will eliminate nothing, and
agreements satisfying any of the five criteria enumerated in the second
part of the test will therefore receive agency approval.
The first three of those criteria effectively reformulate the requirement
that the proposed agreement reduce or moderate costs. Thus, the law
requires approval of agreements that, in addition to reducing or
moderating costs, (1) "consolidate services or facilities ...

to avoid

duplication," (2) "promote cooperation" between the signatories, or (3)
"encourage cost-sharing" among cooperating facilities.78 As noted
above, the first element underlies almost all collaborative undertakings.
The second element is tautological and, it would seem, automatically
satisfied because interfirm agreements presume and depend upon the
cooperation of the participants. The third element, cost-sharing, largely
recapitulates the first, the avoidance of duplication. Any agreement

76. FLA. STAT. ch. 381.04065(2) (1995).
77. Id. at 2(a)-(e).
78. Id. at 2(a)-(c).
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incapable of satisfying one of these criteria would be very unorthodox
indeed.7 9
The final two criteria may be harder to satisfy, but are also very
difficult for the agency to apply. If, improbably, applicants cannot
satisfy any of the other statutory requirements, they can, and will,
obtain agency approval by showing that their proposal promises to
"enhance the quality of rural health care" or "improve utilization of rural
health resources and equipment." 80 The obvious ambiguities of these
requirements-How is quality measured? What constitutes "enhancement" of quality? Does "improved" utilization mean more utilization or
less; higher quality or lower?-make their application imprecise and
uncertain, thereby raising the odds of agency approval."1
The language of Florida's statute is more permissive than most other
reform legislation. In other states, pre-approval review entails an
ostensibly more stringent inquiry into the likely competitive impact of
the proposed agreement. The South Carolina law, for example, is typical
in requiring that applicants demonstrate that "the likely benefits
resulting from the agreement outweigh the likely disadvantages." 2 To
this end, it directs the reviewing agency to consider no less than nine
categories of potential benefit, five categories of potential disadvantage,
and to determine that "any reduction in competition likely to result from
the agreement is reasonably necessary to obtain the benefits likely to
result.""s
Although laws like South Carolina's require greater administrative
attention to prospective competitive harms, they present problems of
their own. Without specifying the weight to be accorded particular
categories of benefit and disadvantage, they command regulators to
compare the pluses of promised efficiencies and provider preservation
with the minuses of reduced competition. This process of comparison
arguably raises some of the difficulties ascribed to proposals for judicial
consideration of potential efficiencies in merger and joint venture
analysis, proposals fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties and
widely thought to decrease the predictability of antitrust law. 4

79. Id.
80. Id. at 2(d), (e).

81. Id.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-560(A)(1) (1994).
83. Id. § 44-7-560(A)(1), (2).

84. Antitrust scholars and commentators have been generally skeptical about applying
efficiency considerations to the analysis of mergers and joint ventures. Judge Posner has
argued that "although clearly relevant," efficiencies are "intractable subjects for litigation."
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution,Horizontal Merger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLuM. L. REv.
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Moreover, by attempting to mix efficiency analysis with the goal of
preserving inefficient providers, the new laws burden state agencies with
an impossible task. If the "need" to preserve local facilities is allowed to
trump other factors-and political pressures in favor of playing this
trump card will be hard to resist-proposed collaborations will likely
encounter little in the way of regulatory opposition. But they are likely
to sustain inefficient providers at some potential cost to consumers.
Although trading off efficiency for continuity may sometimes be socially
desirable, it may not be desirable in every case. And the new reform
measures fail to provide any guidance for determining when continuity
outweighs inefficiency or vice versa. If there is a bias in the process, it
would seem to favor the preservation of existing providers because they
are there, after all, and have a constituency that can lobby for them,
thus jeopardizing the attainment of lower cost or more efficient care.
Under the new statutes, provider collaboration will be easier and occur
more often than it would under a regime of federal antitrust enforcement, especially in markets where the federal laws deterred or prevented
powerful firms from using cooperative arrangements as a cover for pricefixing agreements or market-allocation plans.85 In these markets,
while the new laws will certainly make things easier for providers, they
threaten to harm consumer interests by enabling powerful firms or
groups to raise the prices of important services, lower the quality of all
services, 6 and eliminate unprofitable services essential to community
well being.
In some respects, it is too early to assess the consequences of state
reform efforts. According to recent reports, the pace of collaborative
activity under the new laws has been relatively slow, except in
Washington, New York, Florida, California, and Minnesota-states in
which health reform activities occupy a prominent place on the political

282, 313 (1975). Robert Pitofsky, the current Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
agrees, acknowledging that "[miost efficiencies are exceptionally difficult to measure."
Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 209 (1992). See also Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande,
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, Hearings Before the Federal Trade
Commission on Global and Innovation-BasedCompetition (Nov. 7, 1995) ("a case-by-case
efficiencies defense is essentially unworkable and would significantly decrease predictability and increase litigation costs").

85. Assuming, for argument's sake, that the state agencies supervised the collaborators'
post-approval activities in a sufficiently active fashion to satisfy the requirements of the
state-action doctrine, an issue discussed more fully at supra text accompanying notes 43-

60.
86. Subject, of course, to the limits of malpractice law.
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agenda. 7 But Washington's experience may provide a harbinger of the
future. Reform legislation there spawned an "unprecedented number of
alliances" among health care providers, leading the legislature to
question the wisdom of broad antitrust immunity only two years after
creating the mechanism for granting it.88 In 1995, it directed the
Attorney General to report on whether federal antitrust immunity was
still necessary in the current environment; the report, delivered last
December, concluded that "economics do not seem to support an
argument for immunity," and noted that, in compiling the report, the
attorney general was "not presented with a single example by those in
favor of immunity to support the existence of clear and measurable
benefits to consumers that would result from activities permitted only
if immunity is granted." 9
Why would states adopt these laws? Why stack the deck so heavily
in favor of provider collaboration? And why, in the current antibureaucratic, deregulatory age, would they create new tasks for bureaucrats
largely inexperienced in the workings of health care markets? The
statutes themselves strongly suggest that the willingness to embark on
these initiatives stems from the states' having embraced the health care
industry's view that federal antitrust enforcement places unnecessary
obstacles in the path of provider consolidation and rural health care
reform. In my opinion, this view is mistaken. As the next section of this
paper will discuss, the experience of the past several years offers strong
evidence that federal antitrust law has not been an impediment to useful
collaboration either in the health care industry generally or in rural
markets in particular.
V. THE FRENZIED PACE OF CONSOLIDATION IN THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY

Many in the health care industry profess to believe that federal
antitrust laws and enforcement policy have discouraged many mergers
and joint ventures that would have proved beneficial to health care
consumers. There is, however, little factual support for this belief. The
frenzied pace of merger and joint venture activity in the health care
industry over the past few years suggests that very little collaborative
activity has been deterred.

87. Jeannie Mjoseth, Two Petitions for Antitrust Immunity Approved by Washington's
Health Board, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 24, 1996.
88. Antitrust Immunity Not Supported by Data, Attorney General Concludes, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 3, 1996.

89. Id.

19961

STATE ANTITRUST REFORM

1069

The last two years have witnessed what industry analysts describe as
a "frenzy" of merger activity.90 In 1994, more than 650 hospitals
participated in a merger or acquisition, a record number. Reflecting on
these numbers, one commentator remarked that "nothing in recent
history seems to parallel the activity of 1994. "91 Two Hundred Nineteen investor-owned, for-profit hospitals merged into other privatelyowned chains; 301 other hospitals took part in 176 separate merger
transactions.9 2 By comparison, data compiled by the American Hospital
Association show that in 1993 there were 18 community hospital
mergers, 15 in 1992, 23 in 1991, and 13 in 1990. 93
But that was just a start. The record-breaking pace of 1994 was
eclipsed by the even more feverish activity of 1995. 94 Last year, 735
hospitals were involved in 230 mergers or acquisitions. Compared to
1994, there were fewer large corporate mergers but many more
individual ones: 445 community hospitals took part in 224 transactions.
As part of 44 transactions, 48 nonprofit hospitals became for-profit
corporations; eight for-profits became nonprofit.95 Indeed, over the past
two years, one in five community hospitals has changed hands."
Hospitals have not been the only health care firms choosing to
consolidate. In 1994, publicly traded HMOs completed 13 acquisitions
totaling over $4 billion.97 If approved, the MetraHealth merger will
create a multibillion dollar company that will be the country's largest
provider of HMO services." Blue Cross Blue/Shield companies are
expanding and restructuring themselves through merger. Shares in
physician practice companies trade publicly on national exchanges: The
Wall Street Journal has predicted that there will soon be ten large

90. See Sandy Lutz, Let's Make a Deal, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 19, 1994, at 47.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Nineteen ninety-five was a record-breaking year for domestic mergers and
acquisitions generally, not only in hospital markets. Last year, United States companies
announced 3521 mergers and acquisitions with an overall value of $355.7 billion; in 1994
there were 2958 with a value of $219.9 billion. See MERGERSTAT REV., Dec. 1995, at 1.
95. Sandy Lutz, Mergers and Acquisition Report, 1995: A Record Year for Hospital
Deals, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 18, 1995, at 43). The report does not include data about
management contracts or affiliation agreements between hospitals and managed care
networks.
96. Id.
97. George Anders, Money Machines: HMOs Pile Up Billions in Cash, Try to Decide
What to Do With It, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1994, at Al.
98. United HealthcareBuys Metra Health After Justice DepartmentDrops Probe, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Oct. 4, 1995.

99. See Tomsho, supra note 21.
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companies competing for a potential $200 billion market."° And by
virtue of its acquisition of Surgical Care Affiliates, Healthsouth
Corporation, described as "the dominant player in rehabilitative services
with nearly 500 facilities nationwide,"1"' has become the nation's
largest operator of outpatient surgery centers as well."° Data on
mergers is available because of the premerger notification and approval
process established by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act."3 While the HartScott-Rodino Act does not apply to joint ventures, it seems likely that
those transactions substantially outnumber mergers because they are
less integrative and thus easier to undertake.
For reasons discussed above, the consolidation movement has not
affected rural markets so dramatically as it has other, more profitable
regions. Providers have generally expanded into small and mid-sized
cities so they can offer the growing number of managed care organizations a comprehensive nationwide or regional network of facilities. 1°4
What is clear, though, is that the health care industry as a whole is
consolidating at an unprecedented rate, a fact that seriously undermines
the claim of industry groups that antitrust law has discouraged the
formation of efficient combinations.
VI.

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HEALTHCARE CONSOLIDATION

The fevered pace of collaborative activity in the health care industry
has elicited very little challenge from the federal antitrust agencies,' 0 5
and even less in the way of reported litigation.'0 6 The agencies have
100. George Anders, Physician-PracticeStocks Excite Some Analysts, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 1994, at C1.
101. Douglas A. Blackmon, HealthsouthAgrees to Buy SurgicalCare, WALL ST. J., Oct.
11, 1995, at A3. The acquisition was completed in January of this year. See HealthSouth
Completes Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996.
102. Blackmon, supra note 103. According to Healthsouth's CEO, Richard M. Scrushy,
the company plans to continue to acquire smaller surgical-center companies: "There are
2,000 surgical centers in the country," Mr. Scrushy said, [and] "I'd say 1,300 of them are
targets for acquisition."
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a (1995).
104. Healthsouth, for example, is looking to own a surgical center and "at least" one
rehabilitation center in every United States city with a population of more than 100,000.
Its strategy is to use its expanded surgi-center division to "feed" recovering surgical
patients into its rehabilitation facilities. Blackmon, supra note 103.
105. In their Joint Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating
to Health Care and Antitrust, the agencies note that they have challenged "only a handful
of the hundreds of hospital mergers that have occurred in recent years." Department of
JusticeandFederal Trade CommissionStatement ofAntitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P13,153, at 20,801.
106. From 1989 through 1995, federal courts have decided seven merger cases: United
States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.), affd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir.
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responded to this activity not, for the most part, by challenging its
legality, but by providing regulatory guidance designed to alleviate the
industry's often articulated fears of uncertain and irrational enforcement. In September 1993, and again in September 1994, "in order to
resolve, as completely as possible, the problem of antitrust uncertainty
that some have said may deter mergers, joint ventures, or other
activities that would lower health care costs," the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission together issued their Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care
and Antitrust. 7
The Statements address nine areas of enforcement policy: (1) mergers
among hospitals; (2) hospital joint ventures involving high technology or
other expensive health care equipment; (3) hospital joint ventures
involving specialized clinical or other expensive health care services; (4)
providers' collective provision of nonfee-related information to purchasers
of health care services; (5) providers' collective provision of fee-related
information to purchasers of health care services; (6) provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information; (7) joint purchasing
arrangements among health care providers; (8) physician network joint
ventures; and (9) analytical principles relating to multiprovider
networks.' 8 For all but the last category, the Statement sets forth
"antitrust safety zones" describing activities or transactions that the
agencies will not challenge, "absent extraordinary circumstances."' 0 9
The section on hospital mergers is instructive. It states that "[miost
hospital mergers and acquisitions ...

do not present competitive

concerns.""' It provides a safety zone for mergers in which one of the
merging hospitals "(1) has an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds
over the three most recent years, and (2) has an average daily inpatient
census of fewer than 40 patients over the three most recent years.""'
1989); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd,
898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); FTC v. University Health, Inc., 1991 WL 117432 (S.D. Ga.),
vacated, 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Columbia Hosp. Corp., 1993 WL 183557
(M.D. Fla. 1993); FTC v. Hospital Board of Directors, 1994 WL 362226 (M.D. Fla.), affd,
38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo.), affd,
69 F.3d 1260 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.
Iowa 1995).
107. Departmentof Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Enforcement
Policy and Analytical PrinciplesRelating to Health Care and Antitrust, 67 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1682, at S-1 (Special Supp., Sept. 29, 1994).
108. Id. at S-3.
109. Although the Statements do not explicitly define the term, they state that, in the
agencies' view, "extraordinary circumstances" will be "rare." Id. at S-5 n.2.

110. Id. at S-5.
111. Id.
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It announces that mergers falling outside the safety zone "are not
necessarily anticompetitive, and may be procompetitive.""n
And it
notes that "of the hundreds of hospital mergers in the United States
since 1987, the agencies have challenged only a handful and in several
cases sought relief only as to part of the transaction.""'
The safety zone established in this section effectively shelters the
mergers of small rural hospitals most at risk of financial failure. In this
respect, it amends and liberalizes the prior practice of applying the same
114
analytical criteria governing mergers generally to hospital mergers.
In addition, the section expresses, both explicitly and implicitly, an
institutional reluctance to challenge mergers. Although it does not, and
cannot, resolve the hard cases-mergers and other complicated
transactions are too factually variable to allow for easy predictability of
their legality-the section arguably offers as much certainty about the
specifics of merger enforcement as guidelines can reasonably contain.
The same holds true for the other sections of the Statements. Joint
ventures, the other major form of cooperative activity, receive substantial
attention. Firms are informed that the agencies have never challenged
a joint venture between or among hospitals. Safe harbors are defined,
and attempts are made to identify threshold levels of concentration
likely to arouse agency concern." 5 Again, because joint ventures can
and do take many forms, occur in a wide variety of health care markets,
involve different degrees of integration, and contain widely differing
potential for inflicting competitive harm, their evaluation, like that of
most mergers, is necessarily fact intensive and highly resistant to
formulaic analysis." 6

The Statements have encountered their share of criticism. FTC
Commissioner Deborah Owen, dissenting from their issuance, argued
that uncertainty about the precise scope of the antitrust laws does not
justify sweeping, industry-specific exemptions from its application." 7

112.

Id.

113. Id.
114. Before the issuance of the Statements, federal agencies analyzed the legality of
hospital mergers, like those of all other firms, by resort to Merger Guidelines issued jointly
by the FTC and the Justice Department. See Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104.
115. Id. at 20,573-6 through 20,573-11.
116. For a comprehensive discussion of the factors bearing on the legality of joint
ventures, with respect to their structure as well as their conduct, see Kevin E. Grady, A
FrameworkFor Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 765
(1993).
117. See CommissionerDeborahK. Owen's DissentingStatement on DOJ/FTCAntitrust
Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health CareArea, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rpt.
(BNA) No. 1631, at 376 (Sept. 16, 1993). Commissioner Owen also claimed that the "more
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Scholars have complained that the Statements are ambiguous and fail
to address the issues most likely to arise in the emerging managed care
environment."' Some practitioners have contended that the Statements have paradoxically "created more uncertainty regarding the
permissible scope of physician and hospital networks.""' But because
health care networks are the newest of the emerging forms of organizational arrangements, their competitive consequences are admittedly the
least understood. And, despite their criticism, all commentators
acknowledge that the Statements represent the most determined attempt
yet to specify the factors driving agency enforcement policy and the first
such attempt ever addressed to the concerns of a particular industry
The Statements are not the only form of enforcement and planning
guidance that the agencies have provided to the industry. During the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the FTC issued opinions, consent decrees,
and advisory letters that served cumulatively to define the requisite
structure and permissible scope of hospital mergers and physician joint
ventures.' 20 In that same period, moreover, agency officials wrote
dozens of articles and gave scores of speeches outlining their enforcement intentions and concerns,121 forms of advice that they continue to
offer.
But the agency Statements are unique. No other industry has elicited
its own set of antitrust guidelines, nor has any other been offered the
sanctuary of explicit safety zones. For these reasons, the existence of the
Statements goes a long way toward rebutting the charge that federal
antitrust enforcement policy is arbitrary and unpredictable. To be sure,
the Statements do not cover every conceivable situation. Given the
inherent limitations of linguistic expression, the variability of markets
and business arrangements, and the need for some semantic flexibility
in legal standards, questions of interpretation are bound to arise. Since
the issuance of the Statements, though, the agencies have questioned or
challenged an extremely small percentage of the vast amount of

relaxed enforcement" fostered by the Statements posed the risk of "higher prices and
reduced output or lower quality of care," and that the premises underlying some of the
Statements-that sufficient guidance had been unavailable and that past enforcement
efforts had been unreasonable--"are simply insupportable." Id.
118. See Thomas L. Greaney, A Critique: The Dep't ofJustice/FTC Health CarePolicy
Statements, 8 ANTITRUsT 20, 21 (Spring 1994).
119. David A. Ettinger & Stanford P. Berenbaum, Antitrust Issues FacingMultiprovider
Networks, 29 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 30 (1996).
120. See Grady, supra note 116.
121. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 60.
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collaborative activity that has occurred.' 22 Absent a declaration that
they intend to approve every transaction that health care firms might
propose, enforcement policy could hardly have been made more
transparent.
The practical guidance provided by the policy Statements, coupled with
the agencies' history of cautious enforcement, undermines one of the
major rationales for provider cooperation laws and substantially weakens
the case for state reform. As the next section argues, recent opinions of
federal antitrust courts weaken that case further by demonstrating how
changes in antitrust doctrine have made courts increasingly hospitable
to collaboration and consolidation in health care markets.
VII.

RECENT DECISIONS OF ANTITRUST COURTS APPEAR TO
FACILITATE PROVIDER CONSOLIDATION

In the past six years, federal courts have decided a handful of hospital
merger cases.'2
The hospital industry's dissatisfaction with the
earliest of these decisions apparently constitutes one of the main
impulses for its lobbying efforts on behalf of provider cooperation
laws.124 However, the more recent decisions demonstrate that federal
courts have modified their views of health care markets in light of
competitive developments, adopting more expansive definitions of the
relevant areas of product and geographic competition, and have thus
become less receptive to agency challenges to mergers and joint ventures.
Although mergers and joint ventures are governed by different
antitrust statutes,"' their legality is determined by substantially

122. For a comprehensive description of the agencies' post-guidelines enforcement
activities, see Murray S. Monroe & William J. Seitz, Health Care Under the Antitrust
Guidelines, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 71 (1995).
123. See supra note 108.
124. See Greaney, supra note 60, at 150. For a discussion of the American Hospital
Association's position on these earlier cases and its criticisms of merger policy generally,
see Fredric J. Entin et at., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an AppropriateAntitrust
Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 110 (Spring 1994) ("At best, federal antitrust policy
is imprecise; at worst, it is affirmatively incorrect as it relates to hospital collaboration.").
125. Most merger challenges are brought pursuant to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
which proscribes any merger whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
applies to joint ventures and other forms of competitor collaboration, prevents "any
contract, combination, or conspiracy ... in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act could provide (and has in the past provided) the statutory
basis for merger challenges; however, Section 7 of the Clayton Act is used more often. In
any event, courts in merger cases use the same standard of analysis regardless of the
statute invoked: Will the merger tend to reduce competition or create a monopoly in the
relevant market? See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.
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similar inquiries. In each case, the critical question is whether the
proposed arrangement will so reduce the number of firms in the relevant
market as to enable firms to collude successfully to raise price above
competitive levels.12
The answer to this question depends heavily
upon the proper definition of the "relevant market," a term of art
designed to describe the location and array of firms capable of producing
goods or offering services practicably competitive with those of the
defendant. For analytical purposes, the "relevant market" has two
components, product and geography. The product market consists of the
good or service offered by the defendants and all "reasonably interchangeable" substitutes; 12 7 the geographic market consists of the
territory "in which the seller operates and to which the purchaser can
practicably turn for supplies.""
In the vast majority of merger and joint venture cases, the definition
of the relevant market is outcome-determinative. It is not hard to see
why. If the product market is defined broadly enough to include many
goods or services in addition to those sold by defendants, defendants'
share of that market will be smaller, often substantially smaller, than
it would be in a more narrowly drawn market. The merger of firms with
relatively small market shares does not usually threaten the competitive
evils associated with the creation of bigger firms; therefore, a broad
market definition usually predicts victory for defendants. By the same
token, the larger the geographic market, the more choices there are for
consumers and the less likely it is that defendants will have the ability
to impose durable price increases.
Unfortunately, markets are not self-defining. The crucial issues in
market definition, (1) which products or services are "reasonably
interchangeable" with defendants', and (2) which territory best describes
the area to which consumers can turn for substitutes, require factintensive inquiries and remain, at bottom, matters of degree.129
Market definition is difficult enough in relatively stable markets, but
when industries experience rapid change, as is the case now with health
care, the difficulty of the task is multiplied.

1990).
126. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 445-48. See also Hospital Corp. v. FTC,
807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). (Section 7 forbids
mergers likely to "hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the market to
collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above the competitive

level.").
127. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
128. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1960).
129. See Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990).
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most antitrust courts regarded
health care markets as local in nature, difficult to enter, and easily
monopolized. In United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,30 for
example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order
enjoining the merger of the two largest hospitals in Rockford, Illinois.
The district court had defined the relevant geographic market narrowly,
limiting it to the City of Rockford and its immediate environs, and
therefore determined that the merger would have created a hospital with
a market share of approximately seventy percent, resulting in a highly
concentrated market in which the three largest firms would have
possessed a collective share of ninety percent. 13 Antitrust theory, as
the Seventh Circuit observed, normally regards such markets warily:
"three firms having 90 percent of the market can raise prices with
relatively little fear that the fringe of competitors will be able to defeat
the attempt by expanding their own output to serve customers of the
three large firms.""3 2
The Seventh Circuit conceded that its analysis hinged on the
reasonableness of the geographic market definition adopted by the
district court. But while acknowledging that "[iut is always possible to
take pot shots at a market definition," the court upheld the district
court's formulation under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard,
observing that "for the most part hospital services are local" and that
"people want to be hospitalized near their families and homes, in
hospitals
in which their own-local-doctors have hospital privileg-1
es. 33

In 1990, one might reasonably have thought, as the Seventh Circuit
did, that the business of most hospitals was local in nature and that
special characteristics of the industry facilitated successful collusion by
hospitals in highly concentrated markets. Because the managed care
revolution had not yet taken hold in the payor market, courts could
plausibly have regarded a patient's choice of hospital to be governed by
her doctor and thus effectively restricted to local hospitals where the
doctor held admitting privileges. Furthermore, a variety of factors could
have persuaded courts that new entry into hospital markets was
unlikely and have led them to regard hospital mergers with a heightened sense of alarm.

130. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 1283.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1285. In an earlier opinion involving a merger in Chattanooga, Tennessee,
the Seventh Circuit had taken a similar view of the market for hospital services. See
Hospital Corp. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
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In the late 1980s, prospective entrants into hospital markets could
have encountered three separate obstacles to entry. In some states,
certificate of need laws and other forms of regulation continued to govern
new entry and expansion." Then, as now, new hospitals took time to
construct and staff,"5 and unsuccessful hospitals could not be readily
converted into cash or easily put to other profitable uses, a prospect that
suggested a cautious approach to new entry. Finally, the kinds of freestanding and mobile care centers prevalent in today's market, which are
unencumbered by the entry barriers applicable to full-service hospitals,
had not yet emerged as a competitive force. For these reasons, in 1990
incumbent hospitals in highly concentrated markets that were inclined
to conspire to raise price would be undeterred from doing so by the
prospect of outside entry.
But the hospital market of today is not the hospital market of 1990.
Courts have come to recognize that today's market for acute care
hospital services is no longer a local one. The growth of large, aggressive buyer organizations, hospital clinic outreach programs, increasing
cost consciousness among consumers, and a greater collective willingness
on their part to travel longer distances in exchange for lower-priced care,
have substantially stretched the territorial bounds in which acute care
hospitals compete. Moreover, the success of smaller, free-standing
treatment facilities has demonstrated the growing permeability of old
barriers to entry.
In the past year, merger courts have concluded that these changes
warrant a new approach to market definition. In particular, they have
found that the aggressive purchasing arrangements characteristic of
large managed care groups have worked a substantial expansion of
geographic markets for medical services. Therefore, they have rejected
static measures of market size in favor of more dynamic ones."3 6 The

134. See Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1285 ("Regulatory limitations on entry into
the hospital industry increase the propensity to collude by preventing (or at least delaying
and increasing the cost of) entry by new competitors .... ).
135. According to the President and CEO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation,
which operates 330 hospitals, 100 surgery centers, and various other health care businesses
in 36 states and 2 foreign countries, "practically any hospital can be built and put into
operation in two years." See supra note 29 (testimony of Richard L. Scott).
136. The "static" measure, employed regularly in past hospital merger cases, is the
Elzinga-Hogarty test. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of
Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTiTRTUST BULL. 1, 2

(1978). It looks at empirical data to determine (1) the area from which the defendant
hospitals draw their patients and (2) where residents in that area go for hospital care. It
has been criticized as "static" because it fails to consider necessarily where patients would
go for care if merging hospitals raised prices significantly.
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been particularly active in this
37
decided in November of 1995,
regard. In FTC v. Freeman Hospital,"
the appellate court affirmed an order denying the FTC's request for an
injunction to prevent the merger of two of the three general acute care
hospitals in Joplin, Missouri. Finding that the FTC had failed to
produce sufficient evidence on "the crucial aspect" of geographic market
inquiry, "where consumers of acute care inpatient hospital services could
practicably turn for alternative sources of that product," the district
court had rejected the FTC's relatively narrow market definition in favor
of the much broader one proposed by defendants. 3 '
Similarly, in Morgenstern v. Wilson,'39 plaintiff, a cardiac surgeon in
Lincoln, Nebraska, alleged that defendants, other cardiac surgeons doing
business as the Nebraska Heart Institute, had monopolized the market
for cardiac surgery in an area described as "Lincoln and twenty-six
surrounding Nebraska counties extending in certain directions over 200
miles beyond Lincoln" but excluding "the heart programs in Omaha and
Reversing a
all other regional and national heart programs." 40
district court order in favor of plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit ruled that
plaintiff's definition of the relevant geographic market focused improperly on where cardiac patients in Nebraska "actually went as opposed to
The court held that defendants
where they could practicably go."'
lacked monopoly power in the properly defined, larger market.14 2
Though not a merger case, Morgenstern provides further evidence of the
shift to a more expansive judicial view of the geographic markets in
which some kinds of health care competition are now thought to occur.
Most significantly, in United States v. Mercy Health Services,' a
federal district court in Iowa rejected the government's challenge to the
merger of the only two general acute care hospitals in Dubuque. Again,
the case revolved around the proper definition of the relevant geographic
market. The government contended that the market included Dubuque
County and a half-circle with a fifteen mile radius extending from the
county's eastern edge into Illinois and Wisconsin, and calculated

137. 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
138. Id. at 268. The court also discounted testimony by market participants, a majority
of whom testified that they would not travel outside the FTC's proposed market in the
event that the merging hospitals raised their prices post-merger. The court emphasized
that what matters for this purpose is not what consumers will do but what they could do.
Id. at 265.
139. 29 F.3d 1291 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1100 (1995).
140. 29 F.3d at 1296.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1297.
143. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995).

1996]

STATE ANTITRUST REFORM

1079

defendants' share of that market as between seventy-six percent and
eighty-eight percent.'" Defendants claimed that the proper market
included Dubuque County, the seven closest rural hospitals, and regional
hospitals in Cedar Rapids, Iowa City, Davenport, and Madison,
Wisconsin, " a market in which its share was approximately ten
percent.'1"
The court resolved this dispute by first examining the competitive
changes forced upon hospitals by aggressive managed care companies.
It found that, while the scope of hospital competition had historically
been limited to reputation and amenities, the growth of large, managed
care groups has made many consumers sensitive to hospital prices,
enabling those groups to steer members to lower cost hospitals and
engendering vigorous price competition among hospitals for managed
care contracts. 147 At the same time, the court found competition to
maintain or increase patient volume has caused hospitals to enlarge
their "catchment areas," the areas from which they draw patients, by
branching out into locales previously considered too remote. This
movement has taken various forms-the establishment of hospital-owned
satellite clinics and the purchase of physician practices are two of the
most common-and has naturally led to a substantial expansion of the
area of effective competition between and among hospitals.'"
The court held that the government's narrow market definition
ignored these trends and rested "too heavily on past health care
conditions." 49 Just five years after the Seventh Circuit's declaration
in Rockford that "for the most part, hospital services are local, " " the
court in Mercy found that patients from Dubuque will travel as far as
one hundred miles for hospital care if price incentives are sufficiently
strong, and that doctor-patient loyalty is not powerful enough to
overcome this willingness. 5 '
These dramatic changes in buyer

144.
145.
to offer
146.
147.

Id. at 976.
These regional hospitals were found to be within 70 to 100 miles of Dubuque and
the same or a greater range of services as the defendant hospitals. Id. at 972.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 973-74.

148. Id. at 974.
149. Id. at 978.
150. Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1285.
151. Mercy Health Seruices, 902 F. Supp. at 978. If the court's findings in Mercy about
the aggressive behavior of managed care providers and consumers' price-sensitivity and
travel proclivities accurately describe other markets, the search for medical care becomes
a function of the combined price of the care itself and the cost of travelling to that care: if
the price of the care (surgeries, for example) is high enough and the price differences
between potential providers sufficiently wide, cross-country travel for lower cost care would

become cost-effective.
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behavior formed the express basis for the court's judgment about the
market in which Dubuque hospitals compete. More importantly,
however, they implicitly reconceptualized the notion of hospital
competition. If other courts adopt the Mercy approach, the only mergers
remaining subject to effective challenge will be those involving remote
rural hospitals.
From the perspective of judicial administration, the Mercy court's
approach to market definition is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it
is more sensitive than earlier methodologies to the range of buyer and
seller responses likely to follow a post-merger price increase. In
addition, its appreciation of recent changes in health care financing and
hospital competition promises a more informed jurisprudence. On the
other hand, the prediction of the market's reaction to a hypothetical
post-merger price increase necessarily involves highly speculative
proof 52 the development of which will not only further complicate an
already complicated discovery and trial process, but which will also be
easier, because of its speculative quality, to rebut. This new approach
is likely to increase the government's burden of proof as to the relevant
geographic market and lessen the prospects for successful governmental
challenges to consolidation generally.1 53
Market definition has not been the only issue of concern in hospital
merger cases. Some cases have raised interesting philosophical and
economic questions about the competitive ideology of nonprofit hospitals
and whether consumers have as much to fear from their mergers as from
those of for-profits. 154 Legal scholars and antitrust economists continue to struggle with these questions and with the issue of whether
competition in hospital markets differs qualitatively from competition in
other markets.

5

152. In Mercy, for example, the court's finding rested in part on small-scale survey
results indicating that, given certain cost savings, significant numbers of Dubuque

residents would be willing to travel relatively long distances, up to one and a half hours,
for complex hospital treatment. See id. at 982-83.
153. According to The Wall Street Journal,the hospitals' victory in Mercy "is likely to
embolden hospitals to seek some mergers they may have shied from before." See Bryan

Gruley &Laurie McGinley, Rebuke in Dubuque:Antitrust Lawyers Fail to Stop Deal, With

Big Implications,WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1996, at Al.
154. See, e.g., the discussions in Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1278, HospitalCorp. 807 F.2d
at 1381, and FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
155. See, e.g., Dennis A. Yao, The Analysis of Hospital Mergers and Joint Ventures:
What May Change?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 381. For the most recent addition to the economics
literature and a citation to other works, see William J. Lynk, Nonprofit HospitalMergers
and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437 (1995).
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In addition, recent decisions in the First and Seventh Circuits"5
demonstrate that geographic market definition is not the only area of
health care antitrust undergoing doctrinal expansion. Each decision
involved an HMO that was alleged, among other things, to have
unlawfully acquired or misused monopoly power in a product market
claimed to consist exclusively of HMO services.'57 In each, the court
concluded that because HMOs compete against many other types of
health care financing, plaintiffs had failed to prove that HMO services
constituted a separate product market. 58
In U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc.,"S the First Circuit
noted that HMOs compete in two distinct markets, in each of which they
face "familiar alternatives." On the "financing" front, their rivals include
traditional insurance companies, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans of various
types, and Medicare and Medicaid programs." At the "provider" end,
the court affirmed a magistrate's finding that their competition consists
of preferred provider organizations, "ordinary group medical practices,"
and doctors engaged in independent practice. The breadth of these
markets makes it highly unlikely that any HMO, even a relatively large
one, could attain the high level of market share necessary to arouse
antitrust concern. For these reasons and others,1 ' the court upheld
a ruling that the defendant lacked the power to exclude its rivals from
the relevant product markets. 2
The Seventh Circuit reached similar conclusions in Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic." In reversing a jury finding that
HMOs constitute a separate product market, the court ruled that HMOs
face competition not only from each other but from all "forms of medical
services-contracting that are free from the perceived perverse incentive
Even seemingly powerful HMOs cannot
effects of the HMO form."'
profitably raise their prices above competitive levels, stated the court, so

156. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
157. See Healthsource, 986 F.2d at 596; Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1409.
158. Healthsource, 986 F.2d at 598; Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1409.

159. 986 F.2d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1993).
160. Id. at 591.
161. Id. Especially the fact that its contracts with physicians, though exclusive in
nature, were terminable on short notice, and covered no more than 25% of the primary
physicians in New Hampshire. Id. at 595-96.
162. Id. at 598. For a similar approach to health care financing markets, see Ball
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
163. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
164. Id. at 1410.
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long as they must compete against "an array of [independent] physicians
who among them provide a broad range of medical services."1
By broadly defining the product market in which HMOs compete,
these cases make it unlikely that HMOs or other managed care
arrangements can obtain the high market shares necessary to trigger
antitrust liability. This freedom from liability is especially likely if the
associated providers remain free to contract with nonmembers of the
HMO-earlier decisions effectively immunize nonexclusive, legitimate
HMOs and individual practice associations ("IPAs") from antitrust
challenge's--but is probable even if they do not. The case of Healthsource, for example, legitimated an exclusive contracting arrangement
because the contracts were of short duration and did not appear to
competitors from a substantial portion of the
foreclose the defendant's
67
physician market.
In analytical terms, the practical effect of these recent decisions is to
broaden significantly the size and scope of health care markets. Smaller
markets formerly regarded as appropriate objects of antitrust concern
are now likely to be viewed as components of much bigger competitive
organisms too large and too dispersed to be controlled by any but the
largest firms. The overwhelming majority of hospitals or insurers
wishing to merge or consolidate in these redefined and enlarged markets
will likely be able to do so with impunity.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Marshfield Clinic also contains an
interesting bit of dictum particularly relevant to small rural markets.
The Court acknowledged that north central Wisconsin, the area served
by the clinic, contains some regions-whole counties in fact-"too small
to support more than a handful of physicians."' so The court stated
that if one of those counties were to have just twelve physicians, all
allied exclusively to the clinic, the clinic would be a monopolist but not
an unlawful one. It would be a natural monopolist, "a firm that has no
competitors because the market is too small to support more than a

165. Id.

166. See, e.g., Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679, 695 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (IPA whose members comprised more than 75% of the physicians in the
relevant market lacked market power, because its members were free to affiliate with other
providers).
167. Healthsource,986 F.2d at 594. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that exclusive dealing arrangements may create efficiencies that foster competition and
should therefore be upheld unless they foreclose competitors from a "substantial"
percentage of the relevant market. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
168. Marshfield Clinic, 986 F.2d at 1412.
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single firm.""' The court observed that in such circumstances one
would hardly expect those physicians to compete with each other. "Only
as part of a large and sophisticated medical enterprise... [could] they
practice modem medicine in rural Wisconsin."17
The Seventh Circuit's statement should provide some encouragement
to providers in small rural markets wishing to ally themselves with
regional joint ventures and health care networks. Although proof that a
particular market is "too small to support more than a single firm" may
be difficult to mount, Marshfield suggests that some concerns about
small market concentration and exclusive provider groups may not
necessarily receive a receptive judicial audience.171
Would-be collaborators should also draw encouragement from the
emerging judicial view that most health care markets are easy to enter.
Ease of entry makes a market difficult to monopolize and makes market
power difficult to acquire: if powerful incumbents cannot exclude
newcomers from competing for their high profits, they will be less likely
to charge noncompetitive prices in the first place and unable to sustain
those prices in any event. In the last decade, antitrust courts have come
172
increasingly to conclude that health care markets are easy to enter,
and the continued development of relatively low-cost treatment options,
such as mobile imaging facilities and outreach clinics, are likely to
reinforce that view. Collectively, these factors strongly suggest that
health care collaborations will not face a particularly hostile judicial
response.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The administrative and judicial developments described in this paper
should be good news for most health care providers. They may also be
good news for consumers, if the way to increasing competition can be
kept free of artificial roadblocks. The "trouble" with increased competition, however, is that one firm's gain is often another's loss. Fearful of
becoming losers, incumbents in changing markets sometimes conspire to
keep would-be competitors from entering their markets; if they succeed,

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1325; Marshfield Clinic, 986 F.2d at
1406.

172. Hassan, 698 F. Supp. at 679. In Mercy the court concluded that while Iowa's
certificate of need laws may prevent the construction of new hospitals, existing hospitals
were nevertheless able to enter new markets by establishing outreach clinics as sources of
referrals and by allying themselves with physician groups whose clinics could likewise refer
patients to the allied hospital. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. at 974.
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consumers are harmed. In particular, powerful incumbents in health
care markets have a long history of combining to prevent new competition, and the attraction of conspiracy is still strong.
In the past five years, the Federal Trade Commission, Department of
Justice, and state attorneys general have successfully challenged
numerous attempts by groups of physicians and others to fix prices or
boycott initiatives aimed at cost-conscious purchasing.173 Last fall, for
example, the Justice Department's antitrust division settled two civil
suits accusing hospitals and doctors in separate areas of the country of
trying to prevent managed care firms from competing with them. 74
The suits claimed that in Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph,
Missouri, respectively, the dominant acute-care hospital and a majority
of local physicians formed an alliance to exclude managed care providers
from entering the markets in order to preserve the existing, noncompetitive price levels.7 7 Naturally, the defendants admitted no wrongdoing;
one of the principals of the Danbury alliance noted that his organization
was "similar to many others around the country."' 76
Neither Connecticut nor Missouri has enacted provider cooperation
legislation. If either had, though, it seems likely that the incumbents'
alliance would have received statutory approval and, thus, would have
been immunized from federal antitrust attack. Their consumers would
have been deprived of competitive alternatives. Providers in other states
would not have received the message sent by the successful conclusion
of the Justice Department's suits and might have continued to charge
consumers noncompetitive prices.
This is the risk of state reform legislation. Not only will "unprofitable"
consumers-like Ms. Nelson and her daughter-be placed in jeopardy,
but all consumers will lose their most effective ally in the fight to
maintain and continue the growing competitiveness of health care
markets. As the data about recent consolidation efforts demonstrate
beyond dispute, it is a risk that is unnecessary to foster consolidation in
173. See, e.g., Southbank IPA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 783 (1991) (consent order); Trauma
Associates of North Broward, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 63,805 (F.T.C. 1994) (consent order); La
Associacion Medica de Puerto Rico, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,907 (F.T.C. 1995) (consent order);
Physicians Group, Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 25,223 (F.T.C. 1995) (consent order); United States
v. Health Choice of Northwest Mo., Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 51,808 (D.O.J. 1995); United States
& State of Conn. v. Healthcare Partners, Inc., No. 395CV01946RNC (D. Conn. filed
September 13, 1995); United States v. Classic Care Network, Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,997 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Virginia v. Physician Group, Inc., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
71,126 (W.D. Va. 1995).
174. Health Choice, 60 Fed. Reg. at 51,808; United States v. Healthcare Partners, 60
Fed. Reg. 52,014 (D.O.J. 1995).
175. HealthcarePartners,60 Fed. Reg. at 52,016.
176. Id.
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the health care industry and that promises no corresponding reward.
Federal antitrust laws have helped open health care markets to
competition and are still critical to continue that movement. State
reform laws represent an ineffectual response to the serious problems of
rural poverty and an ill-conceived solution to "problems" with federal
antitrust law that are more imagined than real.

